Introduction
compare a bargaining process to children arguing over the division of an 'ice-cream pie' that shrinks steadily after each failed round of negotiations. The parties are thus motivated to achieve an immediate settlement and agree on a division based on the strategic principle of 'looking ahead and reasoning back'. 1 However, in the presence of asymmetric information it may be difficult to reach an agreement without delay.
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides a good illustration of problems of asymmetry of information faced by the parties involved in a bankruptcy process, namely secured creditors, unsecured creditors and equity-holders. All these participants hold their own private information over the 'true' value of the bankrupt firm, but, as Wruck (1990) points out, they do not necessarily have relevant information or there might be no
incentive to reveal what they know to the other participants. Bergman & Callen (1991) say that in this case the bargaining process may last several rounds before a settlement is achieved, if ever. Hence, firms might need to have successive plans of reorganization until an eventual agreement is reached. 2 Franks & Torous (1989) and Fabozzi et al. (1993) appreciate that the longer the negotiation process, the smaller the value of the firm to be distributed amongst all claimants due to higher bankruptcy costs (see also Jensen, 1989 and Jensen, 1991) 3 . Bankruptcy costs are the deadweight economic costs of firms going bankrupt (see e.g. Weiss, 1990 and Altman, 1984) .
They include both direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy. The direct costs of bankruptcy are legal and other professional fees associated with the bankruptcy filing and are about 3% of firm value at the time of filing for bankruptcy (see Weiss, 1990) . The indirect costs of bankruptcy account for the unmeasurable opportunity costs, e.g. lost sales and a decline in the value of inventory, increased operating costs and a reduction in the firm's competitiveness. Altman (1984) provides an estimate of 10.5% of firm value at the time of the bankruptcy filing.
Instead of focusing on bankruptcy costs for the whole duration of the Chapter 11 procedure as previous authors did, I concentrate my analysis on the time period between the first (rejected) plan of reorganization and 2 See LoPucki (1983a LoPucki ( , 1983b , Tashjian et al. (1996) , Hubbard & Stephenson (1997) and Carapeto (2002) for some evidence of multiple-plan firms. 3 For example, Weiss & Wruck (1998) report that Eastern Airlines' value dropped by more than 50% during its bankruptcy.
3 the effective plan of reorganization. I find that the delay to reach an agreement can be costly, as the available 'pie' might shrink meanwhile, in particular when accounting for the growth in the value of the assets that reflects its cost of capital. Using a sample of 70 multiple-plan firms that reorganized successfully 4 , I show that the reduction in the total distribution to all claimants, i.e. the pie, from the first plan of reorganization to the last one is quite significant and generally affects all classes. The pie shrinks on average by 6.5% during the extended period of bargaining, which gives an extra $26.5 million (direct and indirect) bankruptcy costs, or 2.8% of the assets at the time of filing for bankruptcy for multiple-plan firms. These extra bankruptcy costs seem to fit a concave function in the assets of the firms, which supports Warner's (1977) claims for total bankruptcy costs.
Since the extra bargaining is very costly, why do claimants not accept the first plan of reorganization? Betker (1995) argues that the larger the number of classes of claimants, the more severe the asymmetry problems over the value of the firm and hence a more intense and complex bargaining process. Using the sample of 70 multiple-plan firms and a sample of 27 single-plan firms that reorganized successfully, I find that multiple-plan firms have more classes of claimants than single-plan firms. Wruck (1990) says that claimants will support a value-destroying reorganization provided their share of the pie is greater than that given by a 4 A firm reorganizes successfully when it emerges from bankruptcy with either its independence preserved or is acquired or merged.
value-maximizing alternative. In fact, I show that the larger the deviations from absolute priority rules the more difficult it is to reach an agreement.
In particular, unsecured creditors seem to constitute the driving force in the bargaining process of multiple-plan firms. Unsecured creditors will most likely reject a plan that does not favor them much in terms of deviations from absolute priority rules. In this way, they cause delay in the negotiations even if they risk ending up with a lower recovery due to firm value erosion.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data and methodology. Section 3 discusses the issue of extra bankruptcy costs and their determinants and provides results for both single-plan and multipleplan firms in terms of recovery rates and deviations from absolute priority.
In addition, some influential factors in multiple-plan firms are examined. Section 4 concludes.
Data and methodology

Data sources
The main source for the data used in this paper was the Bankruptcy
DataSource. This database provides information concerning the plans of reorganization and news related to the bankruptcy process for every publicly-traded company with assets in excess of $50 million. 
Methodology
Claimants were classified in three classes: 'secured', 'unsecured' and 'equity' 6 . The estimated allowed claims were obtained from the plans of reorganization, and so were the amounts received upon reorganization, distributed by the categories 'cash', 'debt', 'preferred stock', 'options' 7 and 'shares'. With this information I computed percentage recovery rates and percentage deviations from absolute priority rules, following Franks & Torous (1994) , Eberhart et al. (1990) and Betker (1995) . Recovery rates for each class are given by the amount received by all the creditors in that class divided by the estimated allowed claim at face value for that class.
Percentage recoveries for equity were measured according to two different In this way I am able to assess the fairness of a plan using only one variable. 6 The category 'Equity' includes preferred stock, options, rights, warrants and common stock.
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Stock prices were generally not available for the first plan of reorganization.
However, even when available, their quality was questionable as a result of thin trading. Hence, the stock prices upon emergence were used instead to calculate the payments of the claims, discounted at the implied returns from investing in the Standard & Poor's 500, between the first plan of reorganization and the effective plan. 8
To facilitate a comparison between the payments under the first plan of reorganization and the last one, an opportunity cost was added to the claims of the creditors in the first plan, in line with the time span between these plans. Thus, the assessment is between the payments according to the effective plan of reorganization, and the cash flows that would have been available from investing the payments following the first plan of reorganization in the Standard & Poor's 500 for the period between these two plans. This approach follows Kaplan & Ruback (1995) , where the discount rate for the cash flows is based on the CAPM (Capital Asset 7 The category 'Options' includes options, rights and warrants. 8 Even if all stock prices were available for the first plan of reorganization, it would still be preferable to use the stock prices upon emergence from bankruptcy. As in the proposed plan of reorganization new equity is often being issued, it is not clear what the relation would be between the prices of old equity and new equity.
However, the downside is that the final price might not accurately reflect the expected value when the decisions were made.
Pricing Model), but with an assumed asset beta of one (see Alderson & Betker, 1999) . One underlying assumption is that there is no change in the investment strategy of the firms from the first to the effective plan of reorganization. In order to check the results for robustness, alternative investment possibilities were included in the analysis: i) 1-year Treasury Bills (other maturities were also considered without substantially changing the results) and ii) a conservative fixed rate of 5% per year, which is very close to the average 1-year Treasury Bills over the sample period (slightly below 6%). Single-plan firms spend less time in bankruptcy than multiple-plan firms, which results in fewer cases of debtor-in-possession financing (or DIP financing, which is post-petition financing in bankruptcy) in these firms.
Data analysis
Being smaller and less profitable, the number of classes of creditors is smaller and equity committees are often less frequently appointed in singleplan-firm bankruptcies, even though there are more classes of equityholders. The Districts of New York and especially Delaware (Skeel, 1998) have been shown to provide a faster bankruptcy resolution, and are clearly associated with single-plan firms.
Results
This section provides a measure of the bankruptcy costs incurred during the period of extended bargaining in multiple-plan firms. Indicators such as recovery rates and deviations from absolute priority are computed in 9 An involuntary petition must be filed by at least three creditors and the unsecured portions of their claims in aggregate should be a minimum of $10,000
(see KPMG, 1997, p. 323) .
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order to assess how claimants fare in the plans of reorganization. In addition, there is an investigation of the determinants of these extra bankruptcy costs and the type of firm (single-plan versus multiple-plan). Table 3 gives an idea of the loss in firm value as a result of the extended bargaining, i.e. the decrease in the claims' settlement from the (rejected) first plan to the effective plan of reorganization. An adjustment factor that reflects the opportunity cost of not having invested the proceeds of each company in the Standard & Poor's 500 was added to the payments of all claimants in the first plan of reorganization. I show that the total distribution in the first plan was on average 6.5% larger than in the effective plan (p-value smaller than 1%), which gives an extra $26.5 million bankruptcy costs for multiple-plan firms, for an average effective total distribution of $407.1 million. This is equivalent to 2.8% of the assets at year-end prior to the filing, based on an average asset value of $958.1 million. The percentage change in the total distribution for pre-packs was much smaller, actually -0.4%, but this is not significant at conventional levels. For traditional Chapter 11s, the percentage change in value was much larger, 8%, and significant at the 1% significance level, with increased bankruptcy costs of 3.2% of the assets.
Cost of bargaining
The reduction in the value of the pie is still statistically significant at conventional levels with alternative investment possibilities, namely 1-year Treasury Bills (loss of 3%) and a fixed rate of 5% per year (loss of 3.1%).
This confers some legitimacy to the thesis of firm value dissipation during the period of extended bargaining.
It becomes now relevant to investigate the determinants of these extra bankruptcy costs. Table 4 (1991) and James (1991)). Weiss (1990) however showed that the direct costs of bankruptcy, though highly correlated with total assets, do not fit a concave function. I use a polynomial of second order in the log-assets of the firms and find evidence supporting the scale effect hypothesis that the extra bankruptcy costs fit a concave function.
− A measure of solvency/profitability: The more solvent/profitable the firm prior to filing for bankruptcy, the more feasible it becomes for claimants to delay reaching an agreement, thus potentially incurring in substantial extra bankruptcy costs. Several measures were used, but the best indicators were the ratios assets/liabilities (the inverse was 13 used) and revenues/assets (again the inverse was used), measured at year-end prior to filing for bankruptcy. The higher the solvency and profitability levels of a firm, the worse the loss in value as a result of the extended bargaining, as expected.
− Complexity of the cases: The more complex the case, the more difficult it is to reach a fast agreement. Betker (1995) − Since pre-packs are typically very fast bankruptcy procedures (see e.g. Tashjian et al., 1996) , one should anticipate lower firm value depletion as a result of the extended bargaining. A dummy with a value of 1 in case of pre-pack and 0 otherwise was used as a control variable. As expected, the coefficient is significantly negative. In order to compare the two plans of reorganization of multiple-plan firms in a satisfactory way a time value factor was introduced in the analysis.
Recovery rates
The effect of time value is given by an adjustment factor reflecting the opportunity cost of not having invested the proceeds of each company in the Standard & Poor's 500, which was added to the claims in the first plan of reorganization. We can see that all claimants lose out in the process, in particular in conventional Chapter 11s, where they would have ended up with significantly more had they accepted the very first offer, and also considering time value. This suggests that a prolonged bargaining does not help creditors, as it seems that they do not actually have much leverage in the process in order to obtain larger 'concessions' from the debtor. Table 5 also provides recovery rates for claimants in single-plan firms.
Contrary to multiple-plan firms, all claimants' recoveries are larger in prepackaged bankruptcies, thus suggesting a much lower value erosion in the process. In general, unsecured creditors recover substantially more in single-plan firms whereas equity-holders, on the other hand, obtain significantly higher recoveries in multiple-plan firms.
Deviations from absolute priority
In order to shed some light on the issue of multiple-plan firms I computed another important indicator, deviations from absolute priority rules, which
gives an idea about the strength of each class in the bargaining process.
Percentage deviations from absolute priority rules are produced in Table 6 .
We can see that equity-holders gain consistently in multiple-plan firms, to the detriment of creditors, in particular secured creditors. If we compare deviations from absolute priority between the two plans of reorganization of a multiple-plan conventional Chapter 11, we can see that unsecured creditors gain more from the first plan to the effective one while secured creditors lose out in the process.
This analysis provides some rationale for the behavior of unsecured creditors as a class. They end up getting less in the last plan of reorganization, in particular when time value is taken into account.
However, recovering a small proportion in excess of what they should in the first plan seems to be the driving force to reject such a plan and continue bargaining. The fact that unsecured creditors receive a lower payment in the last plan of reorganization in spite of more favorable (less unfavorable) 17 deviations from absolute priority rules corroborates the fact that multipleplan firms potentially face a higher value erosion (bankruptcy costs) than single-plan firms.
If we now compare the plans of reorganization of a multiple-plan firm and that of a single-plan firm, secured creditors display negative deviations from absolute priority in all cases, and they are not significantly different from each other. Equity-holders gain consistently more than they should in multiple-plan firms than in single-plan firms. 10 There is some evidence that creditors lose less (gain more) in single-plan firms, to the detriment of equity-holders. In addition, deviations from absolute priority for secured creditors seem to be significantly different between pre-packs where they
give up less and conventional Chapter 11s, where they give up substantially more, thus largely favoring unsecured creditors.
An interesting point is that deviations from absolute priority rules for creditors as a whole in single-plan firms are significantly different from those in multiple-plan firms. This analysis thus suggests that one possible reason for the failure of the first round of negotiations was the fact that equity-holders would have recovered substantially more than they should in that instance. However, further negotiations only seemed to result in 10 However, one should note that the negative mean deviations for equity-holders in single-plan firms are not significantly different from zero (lowest p-value = 0.3).
This means that they do not necessarily lose out in these cases.
value transfer from secured creditors to unsecured creditors, with an overall value depletion.
Determinants of multiple-plan reorganizations
The last two sections have focused on the payments that the classes of claimants receive in Chapter 11, both in absolute terms and relative to one another, for both single-plan and multiple-plan firms. But what are the determinants of a multiple-plan firm? − A measure of solvency/profitability: The more solvent/profitable the firm, the more likely it is that the claimants can afford to bargain for longer. Several measures were used, but the best indicator was the assets/liabilities ratio, measured at year-end prior to filing for bankruptcy. Multiple-plan firms are more solvent than single-plan firms as expected.
− The concession of debtor-in-possession financing should be associated with multiple-plan firms, as it makes it easier for them to continue business as usual, without being greatly penalized for not reaching a consensus in the earlier stages of the bankruptcy process. A dummy with a value of 1 in case of DIP financing and 0 otherwise was used.
However, Carapeto (1999) shows that the relative size of the new loan has a positive impact on creditors' recovery rates, so the larger the relative size of DIP financing the more likely a firm is to have needed just one plan of reorganization before emerging from bankruptcy. The ratio DIP financing/estimated total debt was used.
The presence of DIP financing favors multiple-plan firms, and the coefficient of relative DIP financing is negative and significant at conventional levels as expected.
− Complexity of the cases: The more complex the case, the more difficult to reach an agreement in the first round of negotiations. Betker (1995) argues that the complexity of the bargaining can be measured by the number of different creditor classes. A more complex bargaining process is associated with a larger number of creditor classes, which may cause more asymmetric information problems. The number of classes of secured creditors was used as a proxy for the complexity of the bargaining (the number of classes of unsecured creditors was not a significant variable). In multiple-plan firms there are significantly more classes of secured creditors than in single-plan firms (the log was used).
This can be responsible for more problems of asymmetric information over the value of the firms in the former ones and so a delay in reaching agreement.
− The larger the deviations from absolute priority for all claimants in a plan of reorganization, the more likely that plan is to be rejected, as the distribution of firm value is less than equitable. 12 The index of deviations from absolute priority for all claimants following the first plan of reorganization (the effective one in the case of single-plan firms) was used. As expected, the coefficient of this variable is positive and significant at conventional levels.
− Unsecured creditors seem to be the driving force in the negotiations, as they will most likely reject plans that do not favor them much in terms of deviations from absolute priority rules. The index of deviations from absolute priority for the class of unsecured creditors following the first plan of reorganization (the effective one in the case of single-plan firms) was used, and the results show a significantly negative relation with multiple-plan firms.
− In pre-packs part of the bargaining has already taken place prior to filing for bankruptcy (see e.g. Tashjian et al., 1996) , and so the 12 It is fair to note that this indicator uses ex post information, however Alderson & Betker (1996) have shown that estimates of going-concern value supporting the plans of reorganization are on average unbiased.
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likelihood of having multiple-plan firms is lower. A dummy with a value of 1 in case of pre-pack and 0 otherwise was used in order to control for this fact. As expected, the coefficient is significantly negative.
− The appointment of a new top manager before filing for bankruptcy can imply that he will not necessarily align his interests with the equityholders in terms of trying to delay an agreement, and so he might seek a fast emergence from bankruptcy. If the appointment was made in
Chapter 11 already, this compounds the complexity of the process, implying that a previous agreement was not possible with the former top manager and so more bargaining might be needed. Several dummy variables were used to account for CEO and chairman turnover, but the only significant ones were two dummy variables with a value of 1 in case of new chairman before (during) bankruptcy and 0 otherwise. Both coefficients have the expected values and are significant.
− Table 2 shows that one in four single-plan firms are from the manufacturing consumers industry. A dummy with a value of 1 in the case of manufacturing consumers industry and 0 otherwise was used (a classification according to whether the firm is in the retail industry, important for multiple-plan firms, was not critical). The coefficient is negative as expected and significant.
Other independent variables were introduced in the regression but they turned out insignificant at conventional levels. Firstly, the proposer of the first plan of reorganization (only plan for single-plan firms) might matter.
One can reason that if the first plan of reorganization is proposed by the creditors, it is more likely that the bargaining will take longer, with the need for further plans of reorganization. In fact, it is important that equityholders agree with the plan of reorganization in order to avoid a costly and were granted with the amounts that would accrue if the firm were liquidated in a piecemeal liquidation and absolute priority rules were followed. Subsection 1129(b) allows cram-down as to any dissenting class, as long as the Court finds that the "non-consensual plan" does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted the plan. In other words, the absolute priority rule holds for the dissenting class and for more junior classes.
the first plan being associated with multiple plans of reorganization, these results were not significant at conventional levels.
Thirdly, Bergman & Callen (1991) use the proportion of intangible assets in the total value of the firm as a proxy for the amount of damage that shareholders can cause, which reflects their bargaining power in the bankruptcy process. The intangibles/assets ratio, measured at year-end prior to filing for bankruptcy was used. One could think that firms with a large proportion of intangibles in their assets should favor only one plan of reorganization to avoid further value delapidation. However, the coefficient associated with this variable was not significant at conventional levels.
Lastly, Hothchkiss & Mooradian (1998) found that the presence of multiple bidders was associated with delay in the negotiations, as shareholders would postpone the resolution of bankruptcy hoping that more attractive offers would turn up. However, this factor does not seem to affect the type of firm.
Conclusion
Deviations from absolute priority rules are a key factor in the bankruptcy bargaining process. Secured creditors are chronically harmed in the dispute, usually recovering less than they should. Shareholders, on the other hand, persistently gain from absolute priority violations. Unsecured creditors also want to benefit from these deviations. Thus, there is evidence that unsecured creditors are 'bribed' when they get larger deviations from absolute priority rules, thus supporting a faster process with lower bankruptcy costs. Otherwise, further plans will have to be put forward.
Meanwhile, firm value erosion induces lower recovery rates for all claimants, and so at the end everybody typically is worse off as a result of the extended bargaining. Selected characteristics of firms that successfully reorganized in bankruptcy. The financial data is measured at year-end prior to filing for bankruptcy. A firm reorganizes successfully when it emerges from bankruptcy with either its independence preserved or is acquired or merged.
The figures are based on 27 Chapter 11s with only one plan of reorganization (one-plan firms) and 70 Chapter 11s with more than one plan of reorganization (multi-plan firms). The sample period is from January 1989 to December 1997.
Averages ( Table 3 : Reduction in value of the total distribution for multiple-plan firms
Percentage reduction in value of the total distribution, by type of filing, in successful reorganizations. The reduction in value of the total distribution is given by the ratio of the total distribution according to the first plan of reorganization, including an adjustment factor that reflects the opportunity cost of not having invested the proceeds of each company in an alternative investment, and the total distribution of the effective plan of reorganization, minus one. The alternative investments considered are: Standard & Poor's 500, 1-year T-Bills and a fixed rate of 5%. A positive (negative) percentage means that the value of the distribution decreased (increased) between the two plans of reorganization. A firm reorganizes successfully when it emerges from bankruptcy with either its independence preserved or is acquired or merged. The figures are based on 70 Chapter 11s with more than one plan of reorganization. The sample period is from January 1989 to December 1997. * and ** mean significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Table 4 : Determinants of the reduction in value of the total distribution for multiple-plan firms
Ordinary least squares regression of the determinants of the reduction in value of the total distribution for multiple-plan firms in successful reorganizations. The reduction in value of the total distribution (%) is given by the ratio of the total distribution according to the first plan of reorganization, including an adjustment factor that reflects the opportunity cost of not having invested the proceeds of each company in the Standard & Poor's 500 as an alternative investment, and the total distribution of the effective plan of reorganization, minus one. A firm reorganizes successfully when it emerges from bankruptcy with either its independence preserved or is acquired or merged. Accounting variables are measured at year-end prior to filing for Chapter 11. The figures are based on 70 Chapter 11s with more than one plan of reorganization. The sample period is from January 1989 to December 1997. P-values are shown in brackets. emerges from bankruptcy with either its independence preserved or is acquired or merged. The figures are based on 27 Chapter 11s with only one plan of reorganization (one-plan firms) and 70 Chapter 11s with more than one plan of reorganization (multi-plan firms). The sample period is from January 1989 to December 1997. * , ** and *** mean significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, and refer to tests on the equality of means/medians of recovery rates located in adjacent columns. The percentage recovery rate for equity-holders was obtained as a percentage of the ownership retained by pre-existing share-holders, after dilution. e This column reflects a different metric for equity recovery rates: the percentage recovery rate for equity-holders is given by the proportion of their payments over the total distribution to claimants.
Table 6: Deviations from absolute priority in bankruptcy reorganizations
Deviations from absolute priority for each claimant class a , by type of filing, in successful reorganizations. A firm reorganizes successfully when it emerges from bankruptcy with either its independence preserved or is acquired or merged. The figures are based on 27 Chapter 11s with only one plan of reorganization (one-plan firms) and 70 Chapter 11s with more than one plan of reorganization (multi-plan firms). The sample period is from January 1989 to December 1997. * , ** and *** mean significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, and refer to tests on the equality of means/medians of deviations from absolute priority located in adjacent columns. Logistic regressions of the determinants of multiple-plan firms in successful reorganizations. A firm reorganizes successfully when it emerges from bankruptcy with either its independence preserved or is acquired or merged. Accounting variables are measured at year-end prior to filing for Chapter 11. The figures are based on 27 Chapter 11s with only one plan of reorganization (one-plan firms) and 70 Chapter 11s with more than one plan of reorganization (multi-plan firms). The sample period is from January 1989 to December 1997. P-values are shown in brackets.
Independent variables
Multi-plan Due to data unavailability regarding some independent variables this sample is smaller than the initial one.
